

## INTRODUCCIÓN

Este document metodológico incluye los tres apéndices del libro *The Politics of Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism*. Oxford University Press, 2013. Estos son:

- A. Case selection
- B. Description of variables
- C. Measures and definitions

La información aquí presentada se encuentra en el idioma original de la publicación.

## Appendix A Case Selection

**Table A.1**

Electoral authoritarianism: Criteria of case selection

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<i>Dimensions &amp; Criteria of Exclusion</i>	<i>Rules of Exclusion, Examples, and Exceptions</i>
<b>Authoritarian governance</b>	
Exclusion of democratic regimes	<p>Operational definition of authoritarianism on the basis of Freedom House (FH) annual reports on Freedom in the World: Regimes that that obtain Political Rights (PR) scores of 4 or higher (worse). All regimes with PR scores of 3 or lower are classified as democracies and thus excluded from dataset.</p> <p>Rules of exception</p> <p>Rule of exception in the presence of gaps between PR and Civil Liberty (CL) scores (with <math>PR &lt; CL</math>). In general, Freedom House evaluations of political rights and civil liberties match closely. Only in a handful of instances, the two diverged by more than one point. Regimes that received political rights scores of 3, but civil liberty ratings of 5, seemed illiberal enough to merit inclusion (rather than be treated as democratic). Cases: El Salvador in 1984 and Pakistan in 1993.</p> <p>Adjustment of annual scores</p> <p>As Freedom House qualifies entire calendar years, its annual scores usually do not reflect the quality of “deviant” elections held early or late in the year. The database corrects for false authoritarian positives as well as for false negatives.</p> <p><i>False authoritarian positives:</i> In some cases, countries hold foundational or transitional</p>

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elections that involve democratic improvements that Freedom House does not register until the subsequent year. Despite their “bad” FH ratings, we exclude such democratizing elections from the basket of “authoritarian” elections. Cases: Kenya in 2002, Indonesia in 1999, Korea in 1987, Madagascar in 1992, Mozambique in 1994.

*False authoritarian negatives:* In some cases, authoritarian elections are followed by democratic breakthroughs later in the year. We treat the pre-transition election as authoritarian, even if the FH annual rating reflects the posterior democratic opening. Case: the 2000 presidential elections in Peru.

Case exception: Mexico 1982

Between 1979 and 1984, Mexico’s FH political rights scores improved temporarily from four to three. As it makes little sense to conceive these years as an interlude of democratization (even if some liberalization did take place), I included the 1982 concurrent elections into the dataset. This decision was not based on rules, but judgment (my subjective aversion against excluding an election from my “concept-generating case” on quasi-bureaucratic grounds).

Exclusion of closed authoritarianism

Operational definition on the basis of Freedom House: Electoral autocracies (included in dataset) earn Political Rights scores of 6 or lower, closed autocracies (excluded from dataset) obtain PR scores of 7.

Rule of exception

Rule of exception in the presence of gaps between PR and CL scores (with  $PR > CL$ ). Regimes that received political rights scores of 7, but civil liberty ratings of 5, seemed liberal enough to merit inclusion (rather than be discarded as closed autocracies). Cases: Cameroon in 1997, Niger in 1996, Indonesia in 1997, and Togo in 1997.

Exclusion of short-term fluctuations

The notion of a “political regime” implies some minimum of institutional stability. I included elections only if the country remained within the specified range of PR scores (4–6) during *at least four consecutive years*, including the election year.

Implication: Exclusion of “electoral democracies” with only three (or less) consecutive years of “bad” PR scores of 4, such as India (from 1993 to 1995) and Colombia (whose PR scores tended to improve every four years when national elections are held and to worsen in between).

### **Multiparty competition**

Institutional requirement

At least one full set of multiparty elections for the national legislature (Lower House) and the chief executive (in presidential regimes).

Exclusion of regimes that do not admit legal multiparty competition

Exclusion of military dictatorships: Argentina (until 1983), Bolivia (1980–81), Chile (until 1989), Uruguay (until 1985).

Exclusion of traditional monarchies: Bahrain, Bhutan, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Brunei, Swaziland, Nepal (before 1991).

Exclusion of de jure no-party or single-party regimes (even if they allow for intra-party competition): Cuba, China, Libya, Poland (until 1989), Hungary (until 1989), the Islamic Republic of Iran, Taiwan (until 1989), Tanzania under Nyerere, Uganda under Museveni

(until 2005).

Exclusion of regimes that do not admit factual multiparty competition

Exclusion of multiparty regimes in which opposition parties fail to win seats in legislative elections (without explicit opposition boycott): Cameroon in the 1980s, Cote d'Ivoire in 1980 and 1985, Gabon in 1980 and 1985, Kenya in the 1980s, Mali in the 1980s, Niger in 1989, Singapore before 1984, Togo in 1985 and 1990.

Exclusion of multiparty regimes in which winning candidates run unopposed in presidential elections (without explicit opposition boycott): Burkina Faso in 1991, Cameroon in the 1980s, Cote d'Ivoire in 1980 and 1985, Kenya in the 1980s, Niger in 1989, Togo in 1986, Tunisia before 1999.

Exclusion of multiparty elections under repressive conditions

Almost none of the "closed" authoritarian regimes as defined above (on the basis of Freedom House PR scores of 7) hold minimally competitive elections. Those that do are still excluded from the dataset. Cases: the 1996 presidential elections in Gambia, in which coup leader Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh won "only" 55.8 percent of valid votes; and the 1992 legislative elections in Mauritania, in which the ruling PRDS won 67.7 percent of valid votes.

### **Chief executive elections**

Exclusion of electoral regimes that hold "limited" elections only

Exclusion of traditional monarchies, even if they allow for legislative assemblies to be elected in multiparty elections: Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco.

Exclusion of non-democratic regimes that hold national legislative elections, but not elections for the chief executive: Authoritarian Brazil until 1989, South Korea 1980–89.

Exclusion of non-democratic regimes that hold subnational elections, but not elections for the chief executive: Taiwan before 1996.

*Borderline cases:* Inclusion of two borderline categories: the parliamentary systems under military tutelage of Pakistan (until 1999) and Turkey (until 2002), and the quasi-presidential regimes of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia (before 2004) in which elected parliaments chose presidents with fixed terms.

### **Universal suffrage**

Exclusion of exclusionary regimes

Exclusion of electoral regimes with de jure restricted suffrage ("competitive oligarchies"): South Africa under Apartheid.

### **External sovereignty**

Exclusion of countries with formal or de facto suppression of national sovereignty.

Exclusion of states under open foreign tutelage. Polity IV category of "interruption" in which "a country is occupied by foreign powers during wartime, terminating the old polity."

Examples: Afghanistan 1979–93, Cambodia 1979–90, Lebanon (under Syrian occupation since 1975), Bosnia and Herzegovina (under international protection since 1995), Poland and Hungary before 1989 (as members of the Warsaw Pact under Soviet tutelage), former Soviet Republics before formal independence in 1991.

### **Internal sovereignty**

Exclusion of countries

Exclusion of cases of state collapse, identified through Polity IV categories "transition"

without minimal statehood and “interregnum” (“a complete collapse of central political authority”).

Examples: Angola 1992, Burundi 1993–95, Chad 1979–83, Congo-Kinshasa 1992–2002, Ethiopia 1991, Lebanon 1975–89, Lesotho 1998, Liberia 1990–95, Nicaragua 1980, Sierra Leone 1997–2000, Somalia 1991–2002, Uganda 1985.

### Database entry and exit

**Time period** The dataset covers national elections cycles conducted without interruption under conditions of electoral authoritarianism (as defined above) in the time period from 1980 to 2002.

**Entry rules** Regimes enter the dataset with their first set of national authoritarian elections held after 1980. Six electoral authoritarian regimes included in the dataset were founded before 1980: Mexico (1929), Paraguay (1954), Indonesia (1968), Malaysia (1957), Philippines (1972), and Singapore (1965).

**Exit rules** The dataset includes the last national election cycle held in an electoral authoritarian regime before the year 2002. Regimes may exit the database *before 2003* in one of two cases: (1) They go through a *democratic transition*, defined by a sustained improvement of Freedom House PR scores (over at least four consecutive years). (2) They suffer an extra-constitutional “*interruption*” of their electoral cycle (e.g. by military coup, foreign intervention, insurgency, or plebiscitary self-perpetuation in power). Term extensions of sitting chief executives either through plebiscitary means (referenda) or through factual delays (postponement of elections) count as interruptions if they prolong the presidential term by more than one half of the original constitutional term.

Examples of interruptions of electoral cycles:

*Military intervention.* Examples: 1990 military coup in Haiti, ousting president Jean-Bertrand Aristide, elected earlier that year; 1992 military rebellion in Azerbaijan, ousting president Abulfaz Elchibey, elected earlier that year.

*Extra-constitutional removal from office.* Overthrow of president Zviad Gamsakhurdia in Georgia in 1992; overthrow of president Rakhman Nabiyev of Tajikistan, who was elected in 1991 and forced to resign in 1992 by Emomali Rakhmonov (who in continuation provoked civil war and authoritarian closure).

*Ex post extension of terms of office:* 1995 referendum in Kazakhstan, extending the term of president Nursultan Nazarbayev, who had been elected in 1991 for a five-year term, for another full term. Note: the 1996 referendum in Belarus, extending the term of president Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who had been elected in 1994 for a five-year period, by “only” two years from 1999 to 2001 (less than half a presidential term), does not count as “interruption.”

### Size

**Exclusion of small polities** Exclusion of small states with population lower than 1 million in the year 2002.

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division ([www.un.org/esa/population/publications](http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications)).

### Data availability

Exclusion of cases for lack of data      One country that fulfilled our selection criteria, but was excluded due to pervasive data problems: Yugoslavia (Federation of Serbia and Montenegro).

### **Hegemonic regimes**

To distinguish hegemonic from competitive regimes, I relied on two criteria: (1) A minimum *duration* of ten years (since the assumption of power by the ruling coalition). (2) The continuous control of legislative *supermajorities* (with the ruling party holding at least two thirds of seats in the Lower House).

Continuous rule: As it refers to the occupation of state power by the “ruling coalition,” my duration requirement does not invariably demand a decade of overwhelming victories in multiparty elections. A ruling party may be classified as hegemonic at the onset of multiparty elections if its overwhelming victory in first multiparty elections were preceded by at least a decade of single-party rule. An extreme case is Albania. I classify the Socialist Party (the former Albanian Labor Party) as hegemonic only for one election, the first multiparty election it convoked in 1991 after 55 years of single-party rule. The reconverted communist party won by a landslide – before losing power by a landslide in the legislative elections held in the year after.

Rules of exception:

Military might: In a few cases in which rulers had come to power through military coups (and thus were in a good position to send credible signals of hegemonic ambitions at the moment of convoking elections), I handle the 10-year rule with certain flexibility. For instance, when Burkina Faso held its first multiparty election in 1991, only eight year had elapsed since the military coup that brought president Blaise Compaore to power. I nevertheless count the regime as hegemonic from 1991 to 2002 (when it lost its legislative supermajority).

Transitory defeat: I also grant minor exceptions to the rule of continuous supermajorities. The governing parties of Gabon (in 1990), Guinea (in 1995), and Togo (in 1994) suffered transitory losses of their comfortable supermajorities. All three were quick to repair their electoral “accidents” and recovered their qualified legislative majorities in the subsequent elections.

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**Table A.2**  
Authoritarian Election Cycles, 1980–2002

<i>Region &amp; Countries</i>		<i>First election in Dataset</i>	<i>Predecessor Regime (mode of transition)</i>	<i>Last election in Dataset</i>	<i>Successor Regime (mode of transition and subsequent election)</i>	<i># L</i>	<i># P</i>
<b>1 Latin America &amp; Caribbean</b>							
1	Colombia	2002	Electoral democracy (erosion, civil war)	2002	Electoral democracy (borderline) (re-equilibration) (concurrent elections 2006)	1	1
2	El Salvador	1984	Military regime (opening)	1985	Electoral democracy (peace accord) (legislative elections 1988)	1	1
3	Guatemala 1	1985	Military regime (opening)	1985	Electoral democracy (peace accord) (concurrent elections 1990)	1	1
	Guatemala 2	1994	Electoral democracy (erosion)	1995	Electoral democracy (re-equilibration) (concurrent elections 1999)	2	1
4	Haiti	1995	Military regime (external intervention)	2000	Interruption (armed revolt 2004)	3	2
5	Mexico	1982	Electoral authoritarianism (since 1929)	1994	Liberal democracy (opposition victories 1997 and 2000)	5	3
6	Nicaragua	1984	Single-party regime (opening)	1984	Electoral democracy (opposition victory 1990)	1	1
7	Panama	1984	Military regime	1989	Interruption (rejection, external intervention)	1	2
8	Paraguay 1	1983	Electoral authoritarianism (since 1954)	1988	Interruption (military coup 1989)	2	2
	Paraguay 2	1989	Electoral authoritarianism (interruption, military coup)	1989	Electoral democracy (concurrent elections 1993)	1	1
	Paraguay 3	1998	Electoral democracy (erosion)	1998	Regime continuity (concurrent elections 2003)	1	1
9	Peru	1995	Electoral democracy (interruption by executive coup)	2000	Liberal democracy (executive abdication, concurrent elections 2001)	2	2
<b>2 Eastern Europe</b>							
10	Albania	1991	Single-party regime (opening)	1997	Electoral democracy (legislative elections 2001)	4	0
11	Belarus	1994	Single-party regime (independence 1991)	2001	Regime continuity after 2002 (legislative elections 2004)	2	2
12	Croatia	1992	Single-party regime (independence 1991)	1997	Liberal democracy (opposition victory 2000)	2	2
13	Macedonia	1994	Electoral democracy (interlude, erosion)	1994	Electoral democracy (borderline fluctuations)	1	0
14	Moldova	1994	Single-party regime	1994	Electoral democracy	1	0

15	Romania	1990	(independence 1991) Single-party regime (palace coup and opening)	1992	(presidential elections 1996) Liberal democracy (legislative elections 1996)	2	2
16	Russia	1999	Electoral democracy (erosion)	2000	Regime continuity (legislative elections 2003)	1	1

### 3 Central Asia & Caucasus

17	Armenia	1995	Single-party regime (independence 1991)	1999	Regime continuity (presidential reelection 2003)	2	2
18	Azerbaijan	1993	Military coup (interrupting democratic interlude after independence in 1991)	2000	Regime continuity (hereditary reelection 2003)	2	2
19	Georgia	1992	Violent Coup (interrupting democratic interlude after independence in 1991)	2000	Regime continuity (legislative elections 2003, electoral revolution)	3	2
20	Kazakhstan	1995	Single-party regime (independence 1991)	1999	Regime continuity (presidential reelection 2005)	2	1
21	Kyrgyzstan	1991	Single-party regime (independence 1991)	2000	Regime continuity (legislative elections 2005, electoral revolution)	2	2
22	Tajikistan	1999	Violent coup (interrupting democratic interlude after independence in 1991), followed by civil war and authoritarian closure.	2000	Regime continuity (legislative elections 2005)	1	1

### 4 Northern Africa & Middle East

23	Algeria	1995	Single-party regime (transition aborted by military coup, followed by civil war).	2002	Regime continuity (presidential reelection 2004)	2	2
24	Egypt	1984	Single-party regime	2000	Regime continuity (presidential reelection 2005)	5	0
25	Tunisia	1999	Single-party regime	1999	Regime continuity (presidential reelection 2004)	1	1
26	Turkey 1	1983	Military regime		Electoral democracy	1	0
	Turkey 2	1995	Electoral democracy (erosion)	1999	Electoral democracy (re- equilibration)	2	0
27	Yemen	1997	Civil war in 1994 (after state foundation in 1990 and L in 1993)	1999	Continuity (presidential reelection 2006)	1	1

### 5 Sub-Saharan Africa

28	Burkina-Faso	1992	Single-party regime	2002	Regime continuity (presidential reelection 2005)	3	1
29	Cameroon	1992	Single-party regime	2002	Regime continuity (presidential reelection 2004)	3	2
30	Chad	1996	Single-party regime	2002	Regime continuity (presidential reelection 2006)	2	2
31	Côte D'Ivoire 1	1990	Single-party regime	1995	Interruption (military coup)	2	2
	Côte D'Ivoire 2	2000	Interruption (military coup)		Interruption (reversion through mass protest)	1	1

32	Ethiopia	1995	Single-party regime	2000	Regime continuity (contentious legislative election 2005)	2	0
33	Gabon	1990	Single-party regime	2001	Regime continuity (presidential reelection 2005)	3	2
34	Gambia	2001	Military regime (after abolition of electoral democracy by military coup)	2002	Regime continuity (presidential reelection 2003)	1	1
35	Ghana	1992	Military regime	1992	Electoral democracy (concurrent elections 2006)	1	1
36	Guinea	1993	Military coup (ending single-party regime)	2002	Regime continuity (presidential reelection 2003)	2	2
37	Kenya	1992	Single-party regime	1997	Electoral democracy (opposition victory 2002)	2	2
38	Mauritania	1996	Single-party regime	2001	Interruption (military coup 2005)	2	1
39	Niger 1	1996	Military coup (ending electoral democracy)	1996	Interruption (military coup 1999)	1	1
	Niger 2	1999	Military coup (interrupting electoral autocracy)	1999	Regime continuity (presidential reelection 2004)	1	1
40	Senegal	1983	Single-party regime (opening)	1998	Electoral democracy (opposition victory 2002)	4	3
41	Tanzania	1995	Single-party regime (opening)	2000	Electoral democracy (election of official candidate 2005)	2	2
42	Togo	1993	Single-party regime (opening)	2002	Regime continuity (presidential reelection 2003)	3	2
43	Zambia	1996	Electoral democracy (erosion)	2001	Electoral democracy (presidential reelection 2006)	2	2
44	Zimbabwe	1985	Democratic interlude after independence 1980. Single-party regime	2002	Regime continuity (legislative elections 2005, presidential reelection 2008)	4	3

## 6 South & East Asia

45	Cambodia 1	1993	Single-party regime (war transition)	1993	Interruption (military coup 1997)	1	0
	Cambodia 2	1998	Military coup	1998	Regime continuity (legislative elections 2003)	1	0
46	Indonesia	1980	Electoral authoritarianism (since 1968)	1997	Electoral democracy (opposition victory 1999)	4	0
47	Malaysia	1982	Electoral authoritarianism (since 1957)	1999	Regime continuity (legislative elections 2004)	5	0
48	Pakistan	1990	Democratic interlude after military regime	1997	Interruption (military coup 1999)	3	0
49	Philippines	1980	Personal dictatorship (since 1972)	1986	Liberal democracy (electoral revolution 1986)	1	2
50	Singapore	1984	Electoral authoritarianism (since 1965)	2001	Regime continuity (legislative elections 2006)	6	0
51	Sri Lanka	1994	Electoral democracy (erosion, civil war)	1994	Electoral democracy (re-equilibration) (presidential elections 1999)	1	1

# L = Number of legislative elections, # P = Number of presidential elections. Successor regimes after 2002 (end of dataset): If regime hold another full set of authoritarian elections, counted as regime continuity.



**Table A.3**  
Hegemonic party regimes, 1980–2002

<i>Country</i>	<i>Ruling Party</i>	<i>Acronym</i>	<i>Initiation of rule*</i>	<i>Regime origin</i>	<i>Personal leadership*</i>	<i>Years in office</i>	<i>Hegemonic regime termination</i>	<i>Mode of termination</i>
Albania <sup>1</sup>	Albanian Labour Party (Socialist Party in 1991)	PT	1946	Single-party rule, electoral opening	...		1992	Electoral alternation in power
Mexico	Institutional Revolutionary Party	PRI	1929	Civil war	...		1988	Loss of legislative supermajority
Paraguay	National Republican Association – Partido Colorado	ANR	1954	Military coup. Party foundation 1887	Alfredo Stroessner	1954 – 1989	1993	Loss of legislative supermajority (after coup 1989)
Egypt	National Democratic Party	NDP	1952	Military coup 1952, party foundation 1978	Hosni Mubarak	1981 – 2011	2011	Presidential resignation after popular uprising
Tunisia	Constitutional Democratic Rally	CDR	1956	Independence, soft coup 1987	Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali	1987 – 2011	2011	Presidential exile after popular uprising
Burkina Faso	Congress for Democracy and Progress	CDP	1983	Military coup, electoral opening	Blais Compaore	1983 –	2002	Loss of legislative supermajority
Cote d'Ivoire	Democratic Party of Cote d'Ivoire	PDCI	1960	Independence, electoral opening	Henir Konan Bedie	1993 – 1999	1999	Military coup
Gabon	Gabonese Democratic Party	PDG	1960	Independence	Omar Bongo Ali Ben Bongo Ondimba	1967 – 2009 2009 –	... ...	
Guinea	Progress and Unity Party	PUP	1984	Military coup, electoral opening	Lasana Conté	1984 – 2008	2008	Death of president, military coup
Mauritania	Social Democratic Republican Party	PRDS	1978	Military coup, electoral opening	Maaouya Ould Sid Ahmed Taya	1984 – 2005	2005	Military coup
Senegal	Socialist	SP	1960	Independence	Abdou	1981	1998	Loss of

	Party			e, electoral opening	Diouf	–		supermajority
Tanzania	Chama Cha Mapinduzi	CCM	1961	Independence, electoral opening	Benjamín Mkapa	1995	...	...
Togo	Rally of the Togolese People		1967	Military coup, electoral opening	Gnassingbé Eyadéma	1967	2005	Death of president, military coup
Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front	ZANU-PF	1980	Independence	Robert Mugabe	1987	2000	Loss of legislative supermajority
Indonesia	Golongan Karya (Functional Groups)	Golkar	1965	Military coup	Suharto	1965	1999	Resignation of president after mass protest (1998)
Malaysia	United Malays National Organization	UMNO National Front	1963	Independence	Mahathir Mohamad	1981	2008	Loss of legislative supermajority
Singapore	People's Action Party	PAP	1965	Independence	Lee Kuan Yew	1965	...	...
					Goh Chok Tong	1990	...	...
					Lee Hsien Loong	2004	...	...

\* Initiation of regime governed by same party, person or ruling coalition.

\*\* Under hegemonic party rule (not single-party period).

<sup>1</sup> After 55 years of Communist single-party rule under Enver Hoxha, Albania counts as hegemonic system only for its first multi-party elections in 1991.

## Appendix B

### Description of Variables

Regime	Subtype of electoral authoritarian regime. 0 = Competitive regime. 1 = hegemonic regime (constitutional majority by ruling party $\geq 2/3$ legislative seats, regime duration $\geq 10$ years) (see Appendix A for case listing).
Election	Type of national election. L = legislative election (Lower House), P = direct presidential election, and C = concurrent election (within same calendar year).
Region	World region. 1 = Latin America & Caribbean, 2 = Eastern Europe, 3 = Central Asia & Caucasus, 4 = Northern Africa & Middle East, 5 = Sub-Saharan Africa, 6 = South & East Asia.
Post-Cold War	Timing of election. 0 = Cold War election (–1989), 1 = Post-Cold War Election (1990–).

#### Regime manipulation

Exclusion	Exclusion of parties and candidates from legislative elections (legislative exclusion), presidential elections (presidential exclusion) or either (electoral exclusion = highest value of both). Dummy: 0 = openness, and 1 = exclusion. Coding by author (see Appendix C).
Fraud	Interference in electoral administration for partisan advantage at any stage of legislative elections (legislative fraud), presidential elections (presidential fraud) or either (electoral fraud = highest value of both). Range 0–2, with 0 = no fraud, 1 = irregularities, and 2 = fraud. Coding by author (see Appendix C).
Repression	Violations of physical integrity (extrajudicial killings, disappearance, torture, and political imprisonment). Range 0–8, with 0 = full respect for basic human rights, and 8 = gross violation of human rights. Inversion of Physical Integrity Rights Index from Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Data Project (CIRI) ( <a href="http://ciri.binghamton.edu">http://ciri.binghamton.edu</a> ).
Censorship	Limitations on freedom of speech and mass media. Range 0–2, with 0 = no restrictions, 1 = partial restrictions, and 2 = systematic restrictions. Arithmetic mean of Freedom of the Press (Freedom House) and inverted Freedom of Speech and Press (CIRI).
Cumulative index of manipulation	The index normalizes the preceding four measures of manipulation to a scale from 0 to 1 and adds them (counting exclusion and fraud in the legislative and presidential arenas only half in the case of concurrent elections). Hypothetical range 0–4, with 0 = no recourse to any of the four strategies, and 4 = full recourse to all four.

#### Opposition protest

Boycott	Withdrawal of main opposition parties from legislative elections (legislative boycott), presidential elections (presidential boycott) or either (boycott = highest value of both). Range 0–3, with 0 = participation, 1 = boycott threats, 2 = partial, and 3 = full boycott. Coding by author (see Appendix C).
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Pre-electoral protest Active mobilization of followers by opposition (e.g. through public demonstrations, street blockades, strikes) in protest against upcoming legislative elections (legislative pre-electoral protest), presidential elections (presidential pre-electoral protest) or either (pre-electoral protest = highest value of both). Dummy: 0 = acquiescence, and 1 = active protest through contentious collective action. Coding by author (see Appendix C).

Post-electoral protest Opposition protest on election day or afterwards against legislative elections (legislative post-electoral protest), presidential elections (presidential post-electoral protest) or either (post-electoral protest = highest value of both). Range 0–1, with 0 = acceptance, 0.5 = rejection of electoral outcomes (verbal, judicial, or symbolic protest), and 1 = active protest mobilization. Coding by author (see Appendix C).

### Electoral competitiveness

Legislative margin of victory

$$s_1 - s_2$$

where  $s_1$  is the seat share of the largest party, and  $s_2$  the seat share of the second party (lower chamber).

Note: In cases of alternation in power, positive governmental margins of victory turn into negative margins of defeat. Cases: Albania 1992 and 1997, Cambodia 1993, Colombia 2002, Georgia 1992, Guatemala 1985 and 1995, Niger 1999, Pakistan 1990, 1993 and 1997, Sri Lanka 1994, Turkey 1983 and 1999.

Presidential margin of victory

$$v_1 - v_2$$

where  $v_1$  is the vote share of the winning presidential candidate, and  $v_2$  the vote share of the second-placed candidate.

Note: In cases of alternation in power, positive governmental margins of victory turn into negative margins of defeat. Cases: Algeria 1999, Armenia 1998, Belarus 1994, Colombia 2002, El Salvador 1984, Guatemala 1985 and 1995, Niger 1999, Sri Lanka 1994,

Margin of victory

Margins of victory in legislative and presidential elections. In concurrent elections, presidential margins count.

Legislative fractionalization

$$1 - \sum s_i^2$$

where  $s_i$  is the seat share of the  $i^{\text{th}}$  party (Rae index) (see Rae 1967).

Presidential fractionalization

$$1 - \sum v_i^2$$

where  $v_i$  is the vote share of the  $i^{\text{th}}$  presidential candidate (Rae index).

Legislative opposition fractionalization

$$1 - \sum s_o^2$$

where  $s_o$  is the seat share of the  $o^{\text{th}}$  opposition party (Rae index).

Presidential opposition fractionalization

$$1 - \sum v_o^2$$

where  $v_o$  is the vote share of the  $o^{\text{th}}$  opposition candidate (Rae index).

Note: Trivially, estimating the dispersion of opposition actors presupposes the prior identification of opposition actors. Although the distinction between government and opposition is constitutive for modern democracy, in *democratic* regimes it is often less than razor-sharp. Programmatically, government and opposition parties may be very close. Institutionally, they may be sharing power in way that blurs the distinction between ins and outs (for instance, in parliamentary regimes under minority government or in presidential regimes under divided government). In *authoritarian* regimes, the division between government and opposition at times constitutes the primary cleavage of the political system (pro-regime versus anti-regime). Frequently, however, authoritarian governments manage to manipulate the party system to an extent that makes it hard to discern who is fake and who genuine in the crowded field of nominal independents and nominal opposition actors. They set up pseudo-opposition parties, interfere with genuine ones, bribe or intimidate them (see Chapter 3). One might try to cut the fog of political ambiguity and separate apparent from real opposition actors by tapping the nuanced contextual knowledge of country experts. Instead, for pragmatic reasons, I adopted a simple operational rule: I counted the party of the head of government as the ruling party, all others as opposition parties.

*Sources:* I identified ruling parties on the basis of the World Bank Dataset on Political Institutions (DPI), *Rulers*, a webpage that lists heads government worldwide since about 1700 ([www.rulers.org](http://www.rulers.org)), and country narratives in annual Freedom House reports on *Freedom in the World*. Note that the index of legislative opposition fractionalization is identical to the overall index of party-systemic fractionalization in rare cases in which the incumbent party fails to gain legislative representation, as in the 2002 elections in Turkey in which prime minister Bulent Ecevit's Democratic Left Party (DSP) did not win a single seat. Since the idea of opposition parties presupposes the existence of government parties, the calculus of opposition fractionalization is not applicable if no government party contests the election. Rare examples are interim governments run by military officers who first stage a coup and then convoke elections without participating in them (as in Niger in 1999).

Opposition fractionalization

Opposition fractionalization in legislative and presidential elections. In concurrent elections, presidential fractionalization counts.

Effective number of legislative parties

$$1/\sum s_i^2$$

where  $s_i$  is the seat share of the  $i^{\text{th}}$  party (Laakso-Taagepera Index) (see Laakso and Taagepera 1979 and Taagepera 1999).

Effective number of presidential candidates

$$1/\sum v_i^2$$

where  $v_i$  is the vote share of the  $i^{\text{th}}$  presidential candidate (Laakso-Taagepera Index).

*Sources:* Most electoral data are taken from Nohlen (1993), Nohlen et al. (1999), Nohlen et al. (2001), Payne et al. (2002), and University of Essex (2004). These compilations of electoral information were complemented, in particular for more recent years, by Internet sources, such as Election Guide of the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) ([www.electionguide.org](http://www.electionguide.org)), the African Elections Database (<http://africanelections.tripod.com>), the International Parliamentary Union Parline Database ([www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp](http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp)), the Election Results Archive of the University of Binghamton, Center on Democratic

Performance (<http://cdp.binghamton.edu/era/index.html>), the Georgetown University Political Database of the Americas (<http://pdba.georgetown.edu/english.html>), Keesing's Record of World Events ([www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com)), and Wikipedia Election Results ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_Election\\_results/](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Election_results/)).

All calculations by author. Country files with election data (in Excel), specific sources, and a variety of party-systemic indicators are available from the author upon request.

Constitutional majority Ruling party holds 2/3 majority of seats or more in Lower Chamber. 0 = no. 2 = yes. Source: DAE.

### Regime trajectories

Party tenure Number of years the party of chief executive has been the party of the chief executive. Source: World Bank, Dataset on Political Institutions (DPI).

Chief executive tenure Number of years the chief executive has been in office. Source: DPI.

Party alternation Electoral alternation in the party of the chief executive. Official election outcomes designate a winning party distinct from the incumbent party. Excluded: irregular removals from power that precede or succeed an election, such as military coups or electoral rebellions.

Personal alternation Electoral alternation in the person of the chief executive. The incumbent loses according to official election outcomes. Excluded: irregular removals from power that precede or succeed an election.

Electoral sequence Temporal location of an election in uninterrupted sequences of election. Separate counts for legislative and presidential contests. The variable "electoral sequence" combines both. In case of concurrent elections in which legislative and presidential elections of different length coincide, it registers the lower values. (1) = 1<sup>st</sup> elections, (2) = 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> elections, (3) = 4<sup>th</sup> + elections.

Subsequent regime A set of dummies, registers regime trajectories between the current election and the year of the next regularly scheduled election. The possibilities are "continuity" (no regime change), "democratization" (a transition to democracy), "hegemonic opening" (a transition from hegemonic to competitive authoritarianism), and "interruption" (the abortion of the authoritarian election cycle through civil war, military coup, or mandate extensions by more than half of the original constitutional term).

### Political institutions

Parliamentarism Parliamentary system of government. 0 = Presidential system. 1 = Semi-presidential system. 2 = Parliamentary system. From Gerring, Thacker, and Moreno (2005). Replication dataset available at [www.bu.edu/sthacker/data.html](http://www.bu.edu/sthacker/data.html).

Majoritarian rules Majoritarian electoral system. 0 = Proportional representation, 1 = Mixed-member majority or bloc vote, 2 = Majoritarian electoral system. Inversion of "Proportional representation" from Gerring, Thacker, and Moreno (2005).

Municipal elections	Municipal governments are locally elected. 0 = No, 1 = Yes. Source: World Bank, Dataset on Political Institutions (DPI).
State elections	State/ province governments are locally elected. 0 = No, 1 = Yes. Source: DPI.
Subnational elections	Either municipal or state governments are locally elected. 0 = No, 1 = Yes. Source: DPI.
Legislative weakness	Ineffectiveness of national legislatures. Range 0–2, with 0 = Effective legislature, 1 = Partially effective legislature, and 2 = Ineffective (“rubber stamp”) legislature. Inversion of Legislative Effectiveness (variable s22F4) from Arthur Banks Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS) ( <a href="http://www.databanksinternational.com/">http://www.databanksinternational.com/</a> ).
Personalism	Regimes classified as either personalist or hybrid-personalist by Barbara Geddes (Dataset on Political Regimes).

### **Conflict data**

Vertical threats	Sum of demonstrations, strikes, riots in the three year previous to the election year (P3) or in the three years following it (F3). Source: Arthur Banks Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS) ( <a href="http://www.databanksinternational.com/">http://www.databanksinternational.com/</a> ).
Horizontal threats	Sum of government crises, purges, and military coups in the three year previous to the election year (P3) or in the three years following it (F3). Source: CNTS.
Armed rebellion	Sum of guerrilla wars and revolutions in the three year previous to the election year (P3) or in the three years following it (F3). Source: CNTS.
Societal warfare	Levels of internal violent conflict. Continuous range 0–4. Highest value of annual average magnitudes of revolutionary war and ethnic war, from State Failure Dataset, Political Instability Task Force, George Mason University ( <a href="http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf">http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf</a> ) (see Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2001).

### **Social structure**

Population	Mid-year estimations of country population size (1000). Missing data replaced by closest previous data. Source: United Nations Statistics Division, Demographic Yearbook ( <a href="http://unstats.un.org/unsd">http://unstats.un.org/unsd</a> ).
Rural population	Rural population as percentage of total population. Source: WDI.
Literacy	Adult literacy rate (% people ages 15 and above). Source: WDI.
Illiteracy	Adult illiteracy rate (% people ages 15 and above). Source: Author calculations on the basis of WDI.
Inequality	Income distribution inequality (Gini coefficient). Missing data imputed through available data in closest available year. Source: WDI.
Linguistic fractionalization	$1 - \sum l_i^2$ <p>where <math>l_i</math> is the population share of the <math>i^{\text{th}}</math> language group (Rae index). Source:</p>

Alesina et al. (2003).

Religious fractionalization

$$1 - \sum r_i^2$$

where  $r_i$  is the population share of the  $i^{\text{th}}$  religious group (Rae index). Source: Alesina et al. (2003).

Linguistic polarization

$$| [(F_l - .05) * 2] - 1 |$$

In Rae fractionalization indices, values of 0.5 denote situations of bipolarity between two groups (“polarization”) which differ from one-group dominance (Rae = close to 0) and multi-group dispersion (Rae = close to 1). If we subtract 0.5 from the Rae index of linguistic fractionalization  $F_l$ , and multiply the absolute value of the result by 2, we obtain an index of linguistic non-polarization, which I invert in order to obtain my index of polarization.

Religious polarization

$$| [(F_r - .05) * 2] - 1 |$$

In Rae fractionalization indices, values of 0.5 denote situations of bipolarity between two groups (“polarization”) which differ from one-group dominance (Rae = close to 0) and multi-group dispersion (Rae = close to 1). If we subtract 0.5 from the Rae index of religious fractionalization  $F_r$ , and multiply the absolute value of the result by 2, we obtain an index of religious non-polarization, which I invert in order to obtain my index of polarization.

Phones

Number of mainline and mobile phone subscribers (per 1,000 people). Source: WDI.

Military personnel

Military personnel (% total labor force). Source: WDI.

### **Economic performance**

Wealth

Average monetary income per capita (in current Purchasing Power Parities). Either as natural logarithm or in 1000 PPP. Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI).

Growth

Annual changes in average per capita income (election year). I also calculate average growth rates for the 5 years previous to election years (as long as data are complete or near-complete, with no more than one missing year). Source: WDI.

Inflation

Annual changes in consumer prices (election year). I also calculate average inflation rates for the 5 years previous to election years (as long as data are complete or near-complete data, with no more than one missing year). Source: WDI.

Tax revenue

Tax revenue (% GDP). Source: WDI.

### **External linkages**

Trade

International trade (% GDP). Source: WDI.

FDI

Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% GDP). Source: WDI.



ODA	Official development assistance (% GNI). Source: WDI.
Debt service	Total external debt service (% GNI). Source: WDI.
Oil exports	Relative level of mineral fuel exports (as percentage of all merchandise exports). Source: WDI.
Oil dependency	Mineral fuel export dependency (> 25% total exports). Dummy: 0 = non-oil-dependent, 1 = oil-dependent country. Source: Author calculations on the basis of WDI.

# Appendix C

## Coding Manipulation and Protest

### Electoral Fraud

#### General definition

I define electoral fraud in a narrow manner as the manipulation of electoral administration for partisan advantage. It may take place at any stage of the electoral process (before, during, and after election day):

- Voter registration and voter identification.
- Preparation: distribution and location of polling places, appointment of polling station personnel, design, procurement and distribution of polling material.
- Polling: Access to polling stations, voting procedures, secrecy and integrity, polling observation.
- Counting and vote tabulation.

#### Categories

- *No fraud*: No reports on irregularities or fraud; or only “minor” irregularities, excusable administrative imperfections (score 0).
- *Irregularities*: Sporadic and unsystematic irregularities, relevant, yet not decisive, either partisan or administrative in origin (score 1).
- *Fraud*: Widespread and systematic partisan interference with the organization of elections, even if not decisive; or decisive interference, even if not massive (score 2).

#### The scale and impact of fraud

In their elections reports, observers usually conflate two issues one would ideally like to keep apart: the *extent* of authoritarian manipulation and the *impact* of manipulation. I do so as well. My category of fraud involves all instances in which election fraud is either big or decisive. Large-scale fraud counts as fraud even if it did not affect outcomes. Small-scale fraud counts as fraud only if it reports license the conclusion that it affected outcomes in a significant manner. The category thus includes *big fraud* regardless of impact as well as *decisive fraud* regardless of scale.

*Decisive fraud*: I take electoral manipulation to bear a “decisive” impact on (a) legislative elections, when opposition parties would have won a majority or blocking minority in the

legislature, and (b) presidential elections, when the winner would have failed to win either the first or the second round of the contest (in ballotage systems).

*Divergent judgments:* In coding the scale as well as the impact of fraud, I rely on reported judgments by election observers as well as opposition parties. If they diverge, yet do not take opposing positions, I discount the statements of opposition parties. If they publicize opposite claims about the quality of elections, I give some credit to dissenting opposition complaints by “averaging” conflicting judgments (in some rough, judgmental way). Examples: In the 2001 presidential elections in Chad, observers delivered “positive reports,” while the opposition alleged “massive fraud.” In the 1993 presidential elections in Gabon, citizens took to rioting and violent attacks against international observers who had issued benevolent judgments on the election. Both cases went into the intermediate category of “irregularities.”

### Judicial remedies

To the extent that vote rigging is corrected by competent authorities (judicial recourse), it does not count as fraud. An election is also coded as clean if competent authorities order repeat elections due to allegations of fraud and no further complaints arise afterwards.

Rule of exception: Judges may well intervene in favor of authoritarian rulers, rather than upholding democratic rights. For instance, in the 1994 legislative elections in Togo, courts, alleging “opposition fraud,” ordered repeat elections for three constituencies that were crucial for the opposition to achieve a majority in the 81-member assembly. As a result of the repeat elections, the opposition lost its prospective majority. Since international observers were complacent, I coded the election as a case of “irregularities.”

### N-round elections

An election is coded as fraudulent if fraud is present at *any* stage of the election. For instance, if ballot rigging seems decisive in the first round of presidential elections, but not in the second round (as in 2000 in Russia), the election is still coded as fraudulent.

### **Exclusion of Opposition Actors**

*General definition:* Exclusion is defined as formal exclusion from electoral participation of active parties and candidates, regardless of their electoral relevance. (through constitutional provisions, legal rules, or administrative practices).

*Examples:* Denial of registry on political or administrative grounds. Ad hominem rules of candidacy that exclude prominent opposition actors.

### *Categories:*

- Inclusionary elections (score 0)

- Exclusionary elections (score 1)

*Legislative elections:* The binary category of exclusion fits presidential elections better than legislative elections. In legislative elections, the wholesale exclusion of parties as well as the widespread (more than sporadic) exclusion of “uncomfortable” individual candidates qualify as exclusion. Barring individual party leaders from legislative contests does not count, as in Cote d’Ivoire in 1995.

#### Specific coding rules

*Exclusion of latent actors ≠ exclusion:* I register the exclusion of actors who are already established and active on the political scene. Formal bans on political parties that mobilize certain cleavages (like region, religion, or ethnicity) do not count as exclusion as long as they are successful in preventing the formation of such parties. Example: the constitutional ban on religious parties in Mexico.

*Exclusion of incumbents ≠ exclusion:* I assume exclusion to be a strategy of ruling parties. Bans on sitting presidents from re-election do not count as exclusion. Example: In Paraguay in 1992, a fraction of the ruling Colorado party allied with the opposition to introduce a constitutional ban on re-election, thus preventing President Andrés Rodríguez from running again.

*Exclusion of violent actors ≠ exclusion:* The exclusion of violent actors may be regarded legitimate from a democratic point of view. I do not code bans on violent actors, like former coup mongers, guerrilla organizations, regional warlords, and violent secessionist movements, as authoritarian strategies of exclusion. Example: In Guatemala in 1990, neither the military veto to left-wing guerrilla participation nor the legal barring of former dictator Rios Montt count as exclusion.

*Exclusion of authoritarian predecessors = exclusion:* By contrast, the collective exclusion of members of the former authoritarian regime *is* counted as exclusion, unless they openly resort to violence. Example: the ban on members of the Duvalier regime in the 1990 elections in Haiti.

*Exclusion by intimidation ≠ exclusion:* The withdrawal of parties or their refusal to register candidacies because of intimidation and fear (deterrence) does not count as exclusion. If made explicit, such “voluntary” non-participation counts as boycott. Otherwise it should show in repression data.

*Assassination by regime-actors = exclusion:* To prevent dissidents from competing in elections, electoral autocracies usually resort to legal forms. If state agents or regime-sponsored private agents kill opposition candidates, the governments deny responsibility. Still, in case of reasonable doubt, these assassinations should count as exclusion. Example: the assassination of Georgian opposition leader Gula Chanturia in 1994.

*Assassination by non-regime actors ≠ exclusion:* As I strive to capture exclusionary policies by regime actors (or their agents), the assassination of opposition candidates by opposition actors does not count as exclusion. Example: the murder of presidential candidate Abdelmajid Benhadid by islamists in Algeria’s 1995 presidential election.

*Open replacement ≠ exclusion:* Bans on parties do not count as exclusion if successor parties take their place under different names yet similar programs. The same holds for allied personalities who substitute excluded candidates. Assumption: Citizens recognize successors as reliable representatives of excluded actors.

Examples: Greek Albanians in 1992. Ghana in 1992: although pre-1981 parties were formally banned, their representatives nevertheless took part in the elections. Between 1998 and 2001, Turkey went through a succession of moderate Islamic parties: banned in 1998, the Welfare Party was replaced by the Virtue Party for 1999 elections, which was banned in 2001 and replaced by the Justice and Development Party for 2002 elections. The ironic case of 1990 Romania: Opposition parties demanded the communist party to be banned and the ruling NSF to abstain from participating in the first post-communist elections. The NSF banned the communists to win the election itself. As the NSF constituted a veiled communist successor party, the (transient) ban on its own predecessor is not coded as exclusion.

The rule of replacement does *not* apply to murdered candidates (or potential candidates) in presidential contests. Persons are taken to be irreplaceable. Example: The assassination of Georgian opposition leader Gula Chanturia in 1994 counts as exclusion (for the 1995 concurrent elections), even though his wife succeeded him in the presidency of his National Democratic Party.

*Proxy representation ≠ exclusion:* Similarly, banning some parties that represent certain interests or constituencies, while admitting others that represent the same interests or constituencies, does not count as exclusion. Example: In 1999, the Turkish Supreme Court dissolved the Democratic Party of the Masses, a moderate pro-Kurdish party, while the pro-Kurdish People's Democracy Party was able to take part in the election.

## **Opposition boycott**

### General definition

Election boycott is the public refusal of an opposition party to participate in a multiparty election from which it is not formally excluded.

### Categories

- *Participation:* All major opposition parties participate (score 0).
- *Partial boycott:* Some, but not all, major opposition parties boycott (score 1).
- *Full boycott:* All major opposition parties boycott (score 2).

### Specific coding rules

*The identification of “major” opposition parties:* If parties identified as “major” opposition parties withdraw, a boycott is coded as “full” boycott, even if minor parties or candidates stay in the game. Regime-sponsored opposition candidates and satellite parties do not count as “major” opposition forces, nor do genuine opposition parties that are too small to be “relevant” in the Sartorian sense (coalition and blackmail potential). Example: In the 1993 presidential elections in Togo, all renowned opposition candidates boycott. Subsequently, the two nominal opposition candidates who remain in the game gather a bare 3.51 percent of the vote. Independent candidates who boycott legislative races do not count either in my registry of opposition boycotts.

*Official party positions:* My measure grants primacy to official party positions. If individual candidates run, even though their parties call for a boycott, I register the boycott. If parties participate, while individual citizens or civic associations call for boycotts, I do not register a boycott.

*Non-participation of opposition parties for other motives than protest ≠ boycott:* If opposition parties renounce from entering electoral competition out of reasons which are unrelated to the democratic integrity of the election, their non-participation does not count as boycott. The failure of opposition parties to put up candidates out of weakness (as in the 1995 legislative elections in Zimbabwe) does not count as boycott. Nor does their strategic decision to abstain from fielding candidates in certain constituencies. Example: In the 1991, 1997, and 2001 legislative elections in Singapore, opposition parties were over-cautious to appear non-threatening. They decided to field candidates for less than half of the seats to be filled, “thus guaranteeing the government an absolute majority even before voting took place” (Keesing’s World Archive, January 1991).

*Voter boycott = pre-electoral protest:* I distinguish party boycotts from voter boycotts. The category of “opposition boycott” registers the withdrawal of opposition parties and candidates from a given election. Their logical subsequent calls on *voters* to boycott elections through abstention count as pre-electoral protest. The same applies to boycott calls by excluded parties and candidates.

*Election day boycott = active post-electoral protest:* Boycotts declared any time before election day are registered as boycotts. Boycotts declared on election day count as active post-electoral protest.

*Second round boycott = active post-electoral protest:* In an analogous manner, if parties participate in the first round of elections, but then boycott the second round (or any further rounds) in protest over the conduct of the first round (or previous ones), I code their withdrawal as “active” post-electoral protest.

*Boycott by subnational secessionists ≠ boycott:* Election boycotts by territorial units or subnational authorities that aspire to secede from a country (separatist forces in nationalist conflicts) do not count as opposition boycott. Example: the boycott of the 1994 legislative elections in Moldova by the separatist Dnestr region.

*Boycott by violent opposition actors ≠ boycott:* The refusal of violent opposition actors to participate in electoral processes does not count as boycott. Only if insurgents found a political party, with or without previous demilitarization, and their party *then* boycotts, I code their refusal

to engage in electoral politics as boycott. Example: After its secession bid and the 1994 civil war, Yemen's YSP returned politics and subsequently boycotted the 1997 election.

### Pre-electoral Protest

- *Acquiescence*: Opposition parties or candidates acquiesce to an upcoming election. They may or may not criticize prevailing rules or conditions of electoral competition and electoral governance. But they do not mobilize their followers in protest against the electoral process. The category also includes opposition criticism (without mobilization) of top election authorities, or legal recourse against specific decisions (not general rules) by electoral authorities (score 0).
- *Active protest*: Mobilization of followers by opposition parties or candidates in protest against upcoming elections (e.g. through public demonstrations, street blockades, strikes). The category also includes opposition calls on voters to boycott elections as well as legal recourse by opposition parties against the rules of electoral competition, against the general framework of electoral governance, or against electoral authorities (initiation of impeachment processes) (score 1).

### Specific coding rules

*Partial challenges = acquiescence*: When opposition parties challenge specific parts of the electoral system only, not general rules or conditions of electoral competition or electoral governance, their criticism counts as acquiescence. Example: Protest against *election dates* (the strategic timing of election timetables by incumbents) (as has been occurring in most Turkish elections included in database). Only protest mobilization against the timing of *first* elections counts as "active protest." In first elections, timing is crucial for opposition parties to reach the electorate. In subsequent elections, the relevance of the electoral schedule diminishes.

*Organized violence ≠ protest*: The category of "active protest" includes acts of *civil resistance*, such as hunger strikes, tax strikes, sit ins, and street blockades. Acts of (apparently) decentralized, *spontaneous violence*, such as riots or violent clashes between government and opposition supporters (as in the Zimbabwe general elections of 1985), count as "active protest" only if opposition supporters protest the framework of electoral competition or governance. Instances of *organized violence*, by contrast, remain excluded to avoid double counting (they should be captured by CNTS data on armed rebellion). Guerilla campaigns, peasant rebellions, and acts of political terrorism thus do not count as pre-electoral protest, even if they are explicitly directed against elections. Examples: guerilla violence in El Salvador in 1984 or Khmer Rouge efforts to disrupt elections in Cambodia 1993, or calls on voters to stay away from elections, as in Guatemala in 1990 by the left-wing guerrilla or in Algeria in 1997 by the banned FIS.

*Election day protest = post-electoral protest*: The dividing line between pre- and post-electoral protest blurs when opposition parties protest events on election day. As it cannot affect the preparation of the election anymore, election-day protest is coded as *post-electoral* protest.

*Second round protest = post-electoral protest:* Opposition protest against the second (n) rounds of elections after the realization of the first round counts as *post-electoral protest*.

### **Post-electoral protest**

- *Acquiescence:* Either explicit or tacit acceptance of defeat by losing parties or candidates, without public criticism of the electoral process. No more than low-profile criticism of irregularities. Includes also formal or de facto concession of defeat, albeit with complaints about non-decisive irregularities (score 0).
- *Rejection:* The claim that results are falsified and thus fail to reflect the will of the electorate. *Rhetorical rejection:* public complaints that elections were undemocratic, that manipulation was decisive, that irregularities invalidated results. Demands for annulment. *Judicial recourse:* appeals to domestic or international courts. *Symbolic protest:* boycott of presidential inauguration or inaugural session of the parliament (score 0.5).
- *Active protest:* Mobilization of followers in protest against election results, for instance, through public demonstrations, civic resistance, occupation of public buildings, street blockades, boycott of legislative assembly, or the spontaneous outbreak to violence (score 1).

### Specific coding rules

*Objectives and carriers of protest:* Only protests directed against the electoral process and electoral outcomes count as post-electoral protests. Only contentious actions by opposition parties, candidates, party activists, sympathizers or voters counts as “opposition protest”. Protests by other actors directed towards other goals do not count as post-electoral protest.

*Partial rejection = acquiescence:* The rejection of partial election results counts as acquiescence, rather than rejection. Example: demands for annulment or judicial recourse with respect to only “some” or “several” districts or seats in a parliamentary election (as in the 1995 elections in Croatia). The same applies to complaints in presidential elections that focus only on certain problematic areas (as on Albanian villages in the 1999 presidential elections in Macedonia). Exceptions: Partial objections do count as “rejection” when majority balances are at stake (in legislative elections) or when the first or second-round victory of a candidate is at stake (as in presidential elections).

*Organized violence ≠ protest:* As in the case of pre-electoral protest, organized violence by armed opposition actors are not registered as protest actions. The same is true for coups or coup attempts by the military. By contrast, riots and other forms of (apparently) spontaneous violence attributed to “angry voters” (as in the 1990 legislative elections in Gabon) does count as active opposition protest.

*After boycott:* Parties that refuse to participate in an election by implication refuse to recognize its results. Thus, if opposition parties boycott an election (either partially or fully) we code their post-electoral stance as “rejection” even in the absence of further information on their post-



electoral behavior. If they mobilize their followers in protest, we follow established coding rules and register “active protest.”

### Sources and Coding Process

Like most similar measurement efforts, I built the Dataset on Authoritarian Elections through content analysis of international news sources and election observer reports. For all elections, I systematically revised four main sources:

- online Keesing’s Record of World Events ([www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com)),
- historic archive of the Spanish newspaper *El Pais* ([www.elpais.es](http://www.elpais.es)),
- section “Election Watch” of *Journal of Democracy* and
- individual country narratives from the annual Freedom House surveys of political rights and civil liberties (print versions).

Depending on their online availability, I complemented these primary sources by election reports from half a dozen of international election monitoring organizations:

- osce Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights ([www.osce.org/odihr](http://www.osce.org/odihr)),
- Commonwealth Election Law and Observer Group ([www.thecommonwealth.org](http://www.thecommonwealth.org)),
- Organization of American States ([www.oas.org](http://www.oas.org)).
- Carter Center ([www.cartercenter.org](http://www.cartercenter.org)),
- International Republican Institute ([www.iri.org](http://www.iri.org)),
- National Democratic Institute ([www.ndi.org](http://www.ndi.org)), and
- International Foundation for Election Systems ([www.ifes.org](http://www.ifes.org)).

The coding process was conceived as a mixture of content analysis and expert assessments. Content analysis assumes that coder identities do not matter. It conceives coding as a rule-guided process in which coders are exposed to identical pieces of information, apply identical rules of data processing, and therefore move in identical ways from concrete materials to abstract categories (be they numerical or linguistic). The main challenge to the reliable measurement of authoritarian strategies across a large number of electoral regimes worldwide does not lie in the design of workable coding rules, but in the access to factual information (within the constraints of time, resources, and language proficiency that limit any individual research project). Notoriously, news sources based in Western democracies, like the ones I relied upon for this study, provide

highly unequal coverage of elections in developing countries. International observer reports allow to fill in some holes, yet not all.

All variables were coded by two independent coders. In disciplines like psychology and media research, standard operating procedures of content analysis demand that eventual differences between coders be settled by random selection. Given the undeniable insufficiencies of my documentary base, I introduced two elements of expert assessment instead:

- a) Rather than arbitrating conflicting coder assessments by chance (through the random selection of scores from independent coders), I discussed divergent coding decisions with coders and then trusted my own judgment to take the final decision (deliberation and expert judgment).
- b) For the purpose of external validation, I asked regional experts to evaluate my data. Dialogue with comparative political scientist specialized in different world regions led to a handful of corrections (due to additional factual information), in particular with respect to elections in Sub-Saharan Africa. I thank Judith G. Kelly (Eastern Europe), M. Steven Fish (former Soviet Union), Ellen Lust-Okar (Middle East and Northern Africa), Staffan I. Lindberg (Sub-Saharan Africa), and William Case (South and Southeast Asia) for their most valuable expert judgment. Of course, all responsibilities remain mine.

*Documentation:* News reports and observer reports are available at request from the author. Individual election files that permit to establish a one-to-one relation between factual information and original coder decisions are available in FileMaker Pro 6 (.fp5 files).

### **Internal and External Reliability**

To ensure “internal” measurement reliability, I conducted multiple coding. To check “external” consistency, I compared my data to similar measures in emerging cross-national datasets.

#### **Internal Reliability**

Content analysis for my data on electoral manipulation and opposition boycott was conducted by two independent coders: the author and two trained graduate students, one covering Latin America, the other all other regions. Although it is “open to debate” what “constitutes an acceptable level of intercoder reliability” (Neuendorf 2002: 143), a reasonable rule of thumb establishes that coder agreement should be higher than 70 percent (ibid.). Our percentages of intercoder agreement seem acceptably close to that threshold. In the coding of electoral fraud, intercoder agreement lay at 75.9 percent for Latin America, and at 65.9 percent for the rest of the world. As I measure electoral fraud as a trichotomous ordinal variable, the percentage of agreement is a demanding criterion of reliability, as any divergence among coders counts as disagreement, regardless of the distance between their judgments. With a level of agreement of 81.5 percent, intercoder reliability for opposition exclusion also reached acceptable levels. In the

coding of opposition boycott, intercoder agreement consistently surpassed the conventional threshold of 70 percent as well (see Table C.1).

[Table C.1 about here]

### External Reliability

The development of cross-national data largely lies in the hands of private providers (mainly individual scholars and non-governmental organizations) who proceed in an uncoordinated, decentralized fashion. In this unregulated field of private data production, it is not uncommon to see scholars collecting similar data in a simultaneous fashion without mutual coordination or even knowledge. Even when their data intend to measure the same broad concepts, it is often difficult to compare them or even fuse them into integrative datasets. Being similar among each other, they are not identical. They often differ in their spatial and temporal coverage. More importantly, they usually differ in their methodological micro-choices: their formal definitions, their measurement techniques, their choice of primary sources, their units of analysis, their operational rules, their measurement scales, their coding procedures, and their publication formats. The result is an inefficient duplication and even multiplication of measurement efforts (see Schedler 2012a).

The generation of data on authoritarian elections has been a typical instance of information and coordination failures within the competitive market of private data development. When I started developing my dataset on authoritarian elections, minimally trustworthy cross-national data on the key political phenomena I wished to measure (electoral competitiveness, regime manipulation and opposition protest) simply did not exist. In the meantime, numerous individual scholars and research teams have been developing comparative datasets on election outcomes, the integrity of elections, and the behavior of opposition parties. Most of them are limited in geographic, temporal, and substantive coverage, although two recent datasets are global in scope (IAEP and NELDA). Most of them diverge (in more or less subtle forms) in their general definitions and specific coding rules. Some are transparent in their sources and operational procedures, others less so. Some are public, others have not been released yet. Eventually, the scholarly community will need to think about possibilities of making these datasets mutually intelligible and integrating them in a manner that preserves their strengths and corrects their limitations. In the meantime, I limit myself to cross-validate my own data by checking their “external” consistency with roughly comparable data that have emerged over the past years (comparative data files are available from the author at request; for an overview, see Table C.2).

[Table C.2 about here]

*The consistency of fraud data.* The most prominent measure of electoral fraud to date has been provided by the World Bank Dataset on Political Institutions (DPI) (<http://econ.worldbank.org>). It indicates whether “vote fraud or candidate intimidation were serious enough to affect the outcome of elections.” Although a number of comparative studies have used this variable (e.g. Hyde and Beaulieu 2004, Simpser 2004), it suffers from significant conceptual, methodological,

and empirical flaws (see Schedler 2009c: 286–387). Conceptually, it fuses two dimensions that should analytically be kept apart: electoral fraud and candidate intimidation. Methodologically, it obviates basic requirements of transparency, as it does not reveal its sources, definitions, coding rules, and coding procedures.

Empirically, the DPI measure contains numerous scores that raise serious doubts about its validity. It registers several instances of incisive fraud or intimidation that do not coincide with election dates. Most countries maintain their scores between elections, although some scores change even if no national-level elections were held (as in Colombia in 1999). In other cases, records of fraud and intimidation start one year after first elections took place (as in Nicaragua, Ghana, Kenya, and Senegal). The World Bank dataset also contains numerous false positives, that is, records of decisive fraud and intimidation in cases many observers deem fundamentally clean (like in Panama after 1990, Nicaragua in 1990, and Ghana in 1996). Even more frequent are false negatives, that is, records of electoral integrity in regimes most observers would hold to be perpetrators of either fraud or intimidation or both. The long list of rather evident examples comprises Mexico in 1988, Peru in 2000, communist Poland and Romania, the Soviet Union, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Ghana and Kenya in 1992, Zimbabwe in the 1990s, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Singapore.

The degree of correspondence between my measure of electoral fraud (in a dichotomous version that collapses irregularities and fraud) and the DPI measure is very low. Due to the high number of elections without fraud, our overall agreement looks better than random (63.3 percent). Yet, within my universe of cases ( $N = 149$ ), DPI registers 47 instances of fraud and intimidation “serious enough to affect the outcome of elections” while I register 36 instances of decisive fraud. We agree in only 14 of these cases, no more than about a third of our positive observations.

Other recent datasets on the incidence of electoral fraud are of better quality, though most of them are limited in geographic, temporal, and substantive coverage. Jonathan Hartlyn, Jennifer McCoy, and Thomas Mustillo (2008) assess the integrity of presidential elections in Latin America since the 1990s ( $N = 25$ ). They evaluate international observer reports, asking whether observers “accept,” “criticize,” or “reject” an electoral process. Assuming their categories of “acceptable,” “flawed,” or “unacceptable” elections to be roughly equivalent to mine (integrity, irregularities, and fraud), I found almost perfect agreement between our data (96 percent). Our only case of disagreement is the 1993 presidential election in Paraguay, in which I observe irregularities, while Hartlyn, McCoy, and Mustillo observe acceptant observers.

Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle (1997) offer dichotomous evaluations of the “free and fair” nature of first or “founding” presidential elections in Sub-Saharan Africa, extended by Bratton (1998) to second elections. If I merge my categories of “irregularities” and “fraud” and take them as equivalent to their “not free and fair” category, our judgments coincide in 13 out of 18 cases (72.2 percent).

In a more comprehensive effort, Staffan Lindberg (2006b) assesses the “free and fair” nature of both presidential and legislative elections in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1989 to 2004 (updated through 2007 in Lindberg 2009c). He uses four categories: elections that were “entirely” or “somewhat” free and fair (which I take to be equivalent to my elections without fraud), elections in which “irregularities affected the outcome” (which I take as equivalent to my elections with

irregularities), and elections that were “not at all” free and fair (which I treat as equivalent to my fraudulent elections). Our corresponding level agreement is rather low (48.7 percent). While we identify a similar number of acceptable elections (about a quarter of all), Lindberg classifies most of the remaining elections as intermediate cases of irregularities (70.3 percent), while I find a higher incidence of fraud (23.0 percent).

Susan Hyde and Nikolay Marinov (2012) developed a comprehensive global dataset on National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) (<http://hyde.research.yale.edu/nelda/>). Their dataset contains a categorical measure of election fraud: “Were there allegations by Western monitors of significant vote-fraud?” (variable 47). Its level of agreement with my dichotomous measure of fraud (that merges integrity and irregularities) lies at 69.9 percent for presidential fraud (N = 56) and 80.2 percent for legislative fraud (N = 81). To anticipate: NELDA also contains a binary measure of exclusion: “Were opposition leaders prevented from running?” (variable 13). Here, our agreement lies at 79.8 percent for presidential elections (N = 72) and 60.5 percent for legislative elections (N = 119). Our low level of convergence in identifying legislative exclusion reflects the inherent difficulties in categorizing such a graded phenomenon (that contains infinite possibilities of “low-intensity exclusion” targeted against individual candidates and minor parties that lie below the radar of international press attention).

*The consistency of exclusion data.* Two widely used cross-national datasets, the Polity IV dataset on Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions ([www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity](http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity)) as well as the Arthur Banks Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS) ([www.databanks.sitehosting.net](http://www.databanks.sitehosting.net)), contain measures of political exclusion. Deriving its theoretical inspiration from Harry Eckstein’s work on authority patterns, the Polity dataset measures three complex dimensions of political systems: the access to executive power (institutionalization, competitiveness, and openness), the exercise of executive power (limitations on governmental decision-making), and the nature of political contestation (cleavage structures, the institutionalization and breadth of opposition). Data users tend to ignore the theoretical foundations of the Polity project and use either composite indicators of institutionalized democracy (DEMOC) and autocracy (AUTOC) or combined Polity scores (POLITY) as simple measures of democracy, although their component parts as well as their rules of aggregation have been subject to grave methodological criticism (see especially Munck and Verkuilen 2002).

In my view, the only way preserving the validity of Polity data leads through a careful analysis of its disaggregate measures. For the purpose of determining the inclusiveness of political regimes, two of its variables deserve consideration: the regulation of participation (PARREG) and the competitiveness of participation (PARCOMP).

- *Regulation of Participation*, although treated by Polity authors as an ordinal variable, in fact represents a categorical variable that captures various dimensions of political contestation, such as the structure, stability, and depth of political cleavages. One of its categories denotes “restricted” participation, a situation in which “significant groups, issues, and/or types of conventional participation are regularly excluded from the political process” (Marshall and Jagers 2002: 25).
- In a similar manner, *Competitiveness of Participation* is a multi-dimensional categorical variable that combines information about the inclusiveness of political regimes with

information about the nature of political competition. While its category of “repressed” competition denotes closed authoritarian regimes with a “demonstrated ability to repress oppositional competition” (ibid.), the category of “suppressed” competition refers to somewhat more open situations in which the regime allows for opposition activities, but “systematically and sharply limits its form, extent, or both in ways that exclude substantial groups (20% or more of the adult population) from participation.” Under suppressed competition, “large classes of people, groups, or types of peaceful political competition are continuously excluded from the political process.” The “banning of a political party which received more than 10% of the vote in a recent national election,” the prohibition of “some kinds of political organization [or] some kinds of political action,” and the systematic “harassment of political opposition” count as evidence of suppressed competition (Marshall and Jagers 2002: 26).

For the purpose of assessing the inclusiveness of electoral competition, both the *parreg* category of “restricted competition” and the *PARCOMP* category of “suppressed competition” suffer from excessive breadth. Both include too many items to serve the narrow purpose of measuring the legal, administrative, or judicial exclusion of political parties and candidates from the electoral arena. Both categories go well beyond my focus on the electoral arena, as they register the exclusion not only of political parties, but of societal groups, political issues, and forms of protest as well. No less importantly, the *PARCOMP* category of suppressed competition conflates exclusion and repression.

The Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive registers the exclusion of political parties under the somewhat misleading title of “party legitimacy” (variable S19F6). It captures four broad situations (see *CNTS Codebook*):

- Non-party or hegemonic party regimes in which either “no parties” exist or only a “dominant party” and its “satellites” are allowed to compete (score 0).
- Authoritarian regimes that practice the “significant exclusion of parties (or groups)” (score 1).
- The democratically justifiable exclusion of “minor or ‘extremist’ parties” (score 2).
- Fully inclusionary regimes in which “no parties” are excluded (score 3)

Given its leaner conception, this measure seems more appropriate for my current purpose than the much broader Polity variables. Still, as *CNTS* does not reveal its definitions, coding rules, coding procedures, and sources, neither the reliability nor the replicability of its data can be taken for granted.

After concluding my own coding of electoral exclusion, I double-checked my data with the Polity and *CNTS* measures. Since my criteria were more permissive (more sensitive) than those employed by Polity and *CNTS*, I left those cases without changes in which I had coded an election as exclusionary, while neither Polity nor *CNTS* did. By contrast, in those cases I had classified as inclusionary, while *CNTS* coded it otherwise, I accepted the *CNTS* scores if, and only if, at least one of the Polity categories *PARREG* and *PARCOMP* coincided with *CNTS*.

Through this quasi-majoritarian rule of correction, I recoded twelve cases as exclusionary I had originally classified as inclusionary: Panama 1984, Belarus 2001, Kyrgyzstan 1991 and 1995, Burkina Faso 1991, Gambia 2001 and 2002, Singapore, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1991, and 1997. Before this corrective step, the degree of agreement between my exclusion data and Polity PARREG, Polity PARCOMP, and CNTS Party Legitimacy lay at 67.8 percent, 60.9 percent, and 67.2 percent, respectively. After the correction, it lay slightly higher, at 71.1 percent, 67.6 percent, and 73.8 percent, respectively.

*The consistency of protest data.* To assess the legitimacy of Latin American national elections in the 1990s, Hartlyn, McCoy, and Mustillo (2003) ask whether political parties “accept,” “criticize,” or “reject” an electoral process. To allow comparison, I dichotomized the data, assuming that my category of post-electoral acquiescence includes their categories of acceptance and criticism (all recoded 0), while their category of rejection covers both my categories of rejection and active protest (all recoded 1). These recodified binary data show a high level of agreement (13 out of 15 cases or 86.6 percent). Our only two cases of disagreement are the 1994 concurrent election in Mexico (which I code as protest, Hartlyn et al. as acceptance) and the 1989 concurrent election in Paraguay (which I code as rejection and Hartlyn et al. as acceptance).

Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Bratton (1998), and Lindberg (2006b) offer data on opposition protest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Again, our categories are not identical but with some reshuffling can be rendered roughly comparable. As Bratton contains a binary variable of opposition boycott (yes/no), I dichotomize all boycott measures accordingly (combining partial and full boycotts). Lindberg’s trichotomous categorization of boycotts coincide with mine. Our levels of agreement range from 73.4 percent (Lindberg and Schedler) to 81.8 percent (Bratton and Schedler).

With respect to the acceptance of election results by losers, Bratton and van de Walle offer a dichotomous measure (yes/no). Among the two polar possibilities of immediate acceptance by all parties and immediate rejection by all parties, Lindberg offers an intermediate category (the delayed acceptance by all parties or the immediate acceptance by some parties). Recoding his intermediate category as post-electoral acquiescence and using a dichotomous version of my own post-electoral conflict measure (by collapsing my categories of acquiescence and rhetorical rejection) yields 68.4 percent of agreement between Lindberg and Schedler and 71.9 percent between Bratton and Schedler.

The more recent Institutions and Elections Project (IAEP) led by Patrick Regan and David Clark at Binghamton University offers worldwide data on political institutions and practices (<http://www2.binghamton.edu/political-science/institutions-and-elections-project.html>). Its elections dataset offers dichotomous measures of electoral boycott and post-electoral protest. The former indicate whether national elections were “boycotted by a major party,” the latter whether the “election outcome provoked protest or violence.” Both differentiate between presidential and legislative elections. Their level of agreement with my dichotomous measure of boycott (that merges partial and full boycotts) lies at 75.7 percent for presidential boycotts (N = 70) and 80.7 percent for legislative boycotts (N = 119). Disagreements go both ways. I count 11 presidential boycotts (15.7 percent of all cases) and 14 legislative boycotts (11.8 percent) the IAEP data do not register, while IAEP counts 6 presidential boycotts (8.6 percent) and 9 legislative boycotts (7.6 percent) I do not register. The level of agreement between IAEP and my dichotomous measure of post-electoral protest (that merges acquiescence and rejection) lies at 84.0 percent for

presidential protest (N = 70) and 73.7 percent for legislative protest (N = 118). Again, disagreements cut both ways. I count 8 presidential protests (11.4 percent of all cases) and 20 legislative protests (16.9 percent) the IAEP data do not register, while IAEP counts 3 presidential boycotts (4.3 percent) and 11 legislative boycotts (9.3 percent) I do not register.

The National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) contains categorical measures on opposition boycott (variable 14: “Did some opposition leaders boycott the election?”) and opposition protest (variable 29: “Were there riots and protests after the election?”). Their level of agreement with my dichotomous measure of boycott (that merges partial and full boycotts) lies at 79.2 percent for presidential boycott (N = 72) and 82.6 percent for legislative boycott (N = 121). For opposition protest, our agreement lies at 79.5 percent for presidential elections (N = 73) and 79.3 percent for legislative elections (N = 121).

Considering that we all looked at somewhat different factual sources with somewhat different conceptual lenses, the “external reliability” of my data seems to be reasonably high. With some startling exceptions, our levels of agreement hover around 70–80 percent. Still, though percentages of agreement are a quite demanding standard for trichotomous data, they are a rather soft criterion of reliability for dichotomous measures (since a simple random distribution should yield a 50 percent agreement). Besides, whether measures are categorical or ordinal, the simple fact that between about 10 and 30 percent of our data do not coincide with precision is disturbing and bound to carry substantive implications for descriptive and causal inference.

**Table C.1**  
Internal Measurement Reliability: Agreement among Coders

	Latin America	Other world regions
<b>Regime manipulation</b>		
Electoral fraud	75.9	65.9
Electoral exclusion	..	81.5
<b>Opposition protest</b>		
Opposition boycott	89.7	86.5
Pre-electoral protest	89.7	82.0
Post-electoral protest	79.3	75.2



**Table C.2**

External Measurement Reliability: Agreement among Datasets

Dataset	Coverage	Fraud		Exclusion		Boycott		Protest	
		Categories	Agreement	Categories	Agreement	Categories	Agreement	Categories	Agreement
Hartlyn, McCoy, and Mustillo (2008)	Latin America, 1990s	Election quality: acceptable / flawed / unacceptable	96.0 % (N = 25)					Acceptance and criticism / rejection	86.6 % (N = 25)
Bratton and van de Walle (1997) and Bratton (1998)	Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990s	Free and fair elections: yes / no	72.2 % (N = 18)			Boycott / participation.	81.8 % (N = 18)	Acceptance / non-acceptance of results	71.9 % (N = 18)
Lindberg (2006b)	Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990s	Elections are free and fair: Entirely or somewhat / irregularities affect outcome / not at all	48.7 % (N = 74)			Full / partial / no boycott.	73.4 % (N = 64)	Acceptance / non-acceptance of results	68.4 % (N = 64)
World Bank Database on Political Institutions (DPI)	Worldwide, 1975–1997	Fraud and intimidation affect outcome: yes / no	63.3 % (N = 149)						
Institutions and Elections Project (IAEP) Binghamton University	Worldwide, 1972–2005					Boycott by major party: yes / no.	75.7 % P (N = 70) 80.7 % L (N = 119)	Election provokes protest or violence: yes / no.	84.0 % P (N = 70) 73.7 % L (N = 118)
National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA)	Worldwide, 1960–2006	Western monitors alleged significant vote-fraud: Yes / no.	69.6 % P (N = 56) 80.2 % L (N = 81)	Opposition leaders prevented from running: Yes / no	79.8 % P (N = 72) 60.5 % L (N = 119)	Some opposition leaders boycotted election: Yes / no.	79.2 % P (N = 72) 82.6% (N = 121)	Riots and protests after the election: yes / no.	79.5 % P (N = 73) 79.3 % L (N = 121)

P = Presidential elections, L = Legislative elections

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